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martin maner

Samuel Johnson,

Scepticism, and Biography

Distrust is a necessary qualification of a student of history.
(Samuel Johnson, Works [1825] 6: 5.)
I

Samuel Johnson has been described both as sceptical and as dogmatic.

His writings often seem resoundingly final in their judgments, yet the
process of reading Johnson is an exercise in doubt and uncertainty,
especially in the biographies, where his rhetoric makes us suspend our
judgment as we weigh dialectically opposed versions of the truth.
Because he believes that the ultimate moral purpose of biography is
the philosophical one of strengthening the reader's judgment, he tries
to draw us into the process of sceptically weighing probabilities.

His underlying biographical scepticism derives from a variety of
sources, including the "constructive scepticism" of the seventeenth-

century Christian apologists, the scientific epistemologies of Locke
and Bacon, and the critical scepticism of Pierre Bayle.1 Johnson's sceptical manner is a form of philosophical dialectic, a way of juxtaposing
probabilities and forcing us to choose. By means of it he keeps his
inferential procedures visible, as though he wants us to see him judg-

ing probabilities, testing the limits of biographical inference.
As a genre, biography entails a number of uncertainties. What does
it mean to "know" another person? If it is difficult sometimes to
understand our own motives, actions, and emotions, how well can we
understand those of another person?
In estimating the pain or pleasure of any particular state, every man,
indeed, draws his decisions from his own breast, and cannot with cer-

Maner

Johnson's scepticism

303

tainty determine, whether other minds are affected by the same causes in
the same manner. Yet by this criterion we must be content to judge,
because no other can be obtained (Yale Works 2:493).

Johnson characteristically resolves such doubts "commonsensically,"
by suggesting that there is a degree of certainty appropriate to each
sphere in life, and that it is vain to wish for more certainty than experience allows.

When dealing with uncertain testimony, Johnson tends to think
along lines laid down by Locke and the constructive sceptics of the
seventeenth century, authorities on judging probable evidence. In
evaluating testimony, Johnson displays his most consistent scepticism
and his most consistent criteria for evaluating biographical truth-

claims. Although these criteria are nowhere systematically set forth in
Johnson's writings, they can be ascertained by "mapping" Johnson's
expressions of doubt and his ways of resolving those doubts. But first
it is necessary to understand the complex relationship between Johnson the biographer and Johnson the student of the religious, philosophical, and general scepticism of his era.
Some students of eighteenth-century literature might object to the
use of the term "scepticism" in characterizing Johnson's thought,
because they associate the term with an inverted dogmatism that
denies the possibility of genuine knowledge. Others might object that
"scepticism" connotes lack of Christian faith. The connotations of
"scepticism" are wrong for Johnson on both counts. But despite Johnson's rejection of the more extreme forms of sceptical doubt, his manner of sifting historical and biographical testimony shows everywhere
the influence of constructive scepticism; furthermore, his methods as a
biographer were motivated by, and modulated by, his reaction to the
philosophical and religious scepticisms of his day.
We should distinguish between several historically interrelated

meanings of the word scepticism. Most narrowly, the word has come to
mean "unbelief with regard to the Christian religion" (OED). More

broadly, scepticism can mean doubt about whether there is a God.
More broadly still, scepticism can mean the opinion that real knowledge of any kind is or may be unattainable; this is "philosophical scepticism."2 Finally, scepticism in the broadest sense denotes "disposition
to doubt or incredulity in general" (OED). I follow Phillip Harth in
using the term to denote the methodical application of doubt as part of
the process of inquiry (Harth 1-31).

As a historical movement, philosophical scepticism influenced
Johnson more through its effect upon scientific epistemology and sev-
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enteenth-century religious controversy than through the writings of

his contemporaries or of earlier continental sceptics. He apparently
read the Renaissance sceptics with little sympathy. In the opening lecture of Part II of the Vinerian lectures, for instance, he refers to Mon-

taigne as an "ingenious but whimsical French author" (McAdam 107).
Of Johnson's attitude toward the important sceptics of seventeenthcentury FranceÂ—NaudÃ©, Patin, MarandÃ©, Le Vayer, Gassendi, La PeyrÃ¨re, SorbiereÂ—we know very little. He read Gassendi's biography of
Peiresc, and he owned Gassendi's collected works (Boswell 2: 521n;
Greene, Library 86, 60). Johnson read Glanvill's Scepsis ScientificaÂ—
he quoted from it in the DictionaryÂ—and he certainly knew of Sorbiere, if only by way of SorbiÃ¨re's preface to Gassendi or Sprat's Obser-

vations on SorbiÃ¨re's Voyage into England.3
Rather than deriving from specific philosophical influences, Johnson's sceptical patterns of thought were conscious dialectical strata-

gems which he assimilated from a centuries-long tradition of sceptical
argument. Revived in the Renaissance and variously modified in religious, scientific, and philosophical controversies over a period of two

hundred years, scepticism in fact influenced Johnson indirectly in so
many ways that the lines of influence must be carefully disentangled.
The philosophical scepticism of the ancient world was embodied

mainly in the writings of Cicero and Sextus Empiricus. Rediscovered
and published in the sixteenth century, the writings of Empiricus
immediately played a part in two parallel controversies. In the philosophical-scientific realm, sceptical arguments were instrumental in the

evolution of the new science's empirical epistemology. In the moralreligious realm, sceptical arguments were employed in the Rule of
Faith controversy revolving around the uncertainty of a criterion of
truth in Christian belief.

Religious apologists, whether Catholic or Protestant, found sceptical arguments useful in support of faith. Since all knowledge is uncertain, they argued, this general uncertainty gives us all the more reason
for accepting the best-attested religious truths on faith. The constructive sceptics argued that in a subject as vital as religion, one should
stop short of unreasonable doubt. Johnson liked this "commonsensical" way of resolving uncertainty.

The trouble is, a sceptical attack upon the grounds for scepticism
merely gives rise to another basis for argument: what criterion distinguishes reasonable from unreasonable doubt? Such an argument about
a truth-criterion requires another criterion to solve it, and the Pyrrhonian method of sceptical argument deriving from Sextus Empiricus
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refuses to grant such a criterion. This was the logical impasse created
by the problem of truth-criteria in the centuries-long Reformation
debate over the "Rule of Faith," or criterion of religious knowledge.
Luther sceptically questioned Papal authority and proposed a new criterion: what our consciences compel us to believe upon reading scripture is true. In reply, Erasmus gave sceptical reasons for remaining
Catholic. Pyrrhonian arguments for and against religious beliefs
became standard weapons of the Reformation and the Counter-Refor-

mation, especially in France, where Pyrrhonism was used to attack the
Calvinists' use of "inner persuasion" as the Rule of Faith.
A similar use of scepticism in support of religious belief emerged

among the Anglican apologists and English scientists of the seventeenth century, who met the challenge of Pyrrhonism by formulating a
commonsensical approach to truth-criteria. Stillingfleet, Chilling-

worth, and Tillotson are the main exemplars of this line of thought,
and they number among the authors Richard Popkin refers to as the
"constructive sceptics" of the seventeenth century, the "divines and
others of the last century" to whom, John Hawkins said, Johnson
"owed his excellence as a writer" (see Yale Works 3: xxxiii). Johnson
follows their lead in applying sceptical doubt constructively, seeing it
as a temporary stage in the process of arriving at probable truth.

William Chillingworth's The Religion of Protestants was an early
English adaptation of the views expressed by Castellio (De Arte dubitandi) and Grotius (De VertÃ-ate religionis christianae), an author Johnson struggled to read at age ten, who tried to show that it is impossible

to attain complete certainty in religion, and that consequently we need
to be content with reasonable degrees of probability in religious matters. In the writings of Chillingworth and Tillotson, as well as in those

of such apologists for the new science as Wilkins, Glanvill, Boyle,
Locke, and Newton, "common sense about every day affairs is made
the basis for settlement of perplexities about religion" (Van Leeuwen
xiii). The commonsense mitigation of scepticism was based on the idea
that "there are several levels of certainty ranging from absolute certainty to mere probability, each determined by a particular kind of evidence, and that an exact proportion must be maintained between evi-

dence and certainty" (Van Leeuwen 14).
Because their central concern was the question of evidences for the
Christian faith, and because such key evidences as miracles and prophecies derive from historical testimony, Chillingworth and Tillotson
especially tended to concentrate on evaluating degrees of certainty in
questions of testimony. Their criteria for evaluating testimony, deriv-
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ing from ancient rhetorical canons for evaluating witnesses' reliability
(Patey 7), evolved into those of Locke, who enumerated six: the num-

ber, integrity, and skill of witnesses, their purpose, the internal and
external consistency of the circumstances related, and the presence or
absence of contradictory testimony. Locke also shared the tendency of
the "constructive sceptics" to apply sceptical and probabilistic reasoning to questions of morality and religion; one of his arguments for toleration is the typically sceptical one that since religious questions are

often questions of probability, we should tolerate each other's views.
Johnson's familiarity with sceptical patterns of thought certainly owed
much to his acquaintance with these seventeenth-century constructive
sceptics; in particular, we know that his interest in the question of evidences for the Christian faith "continued to be one of his primary
intellectual concerns until the final days of his life" (Walker, "Evidences" 41).
His most famous remarks on the subject of Christian evidences and

sceptical doubt occurred in a conversation with Boswell on July 14,
1763:

Talking of those who denied the truth of Christianity, he said, "It is

always easy to be on the negative side. If a man were to deny that there is
salt upon the table, you could not reduce him to an absurdity. Come, let
us try this a little further. I deny that Canada is taken, and I can support
my denial by pretty good arguments. The French are a much more
numerous people than we; and it is not likely that they would allow us to

take it. 'But the ministry have assured us, in all the formality of the
Gazette, that it is taken.'Â—Ay, but these men have still more interest in
deceiving us. They don't want that you should think the French have

beat them, but that they have beat the French. Now suppose you should
go over and find that it is really taken, that would only satisfy yourself;

for when you come home we will not believe you. We will say, you have
been bribed.Â—Yet, Sir, notwithstanding all these plausible objections,
we have no doubt that Canada is really ours. Such is the weight of com-

mon testimony. How much stronger are the evidences of the Christian
religion?" (Boswell 1: 428)
Johnson uses sceptical arguments constructively in this famous pas-

sage. He refers to sense impressions as a criterion ("salt upon the
table") to show that even the most certain of sense impressions may be
subjected to unreasonable doubt; he then shifts to a question of testimony, where doubt may more reasonably be entertained; he impugns

the number and the integrity of witnesses; and he triumphantly and
commonsensically dismisses these grounds for doubt. He argues else-
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where that "we have as strong evidence for the miracles ... as the
nature of the thing admits" (Boswell 1: 444-45). In using common

sense as a criterion, and in evaluating levels or degrees of probability,
Johnson follows in the footsteps of the constructive sceptics. In fact, as
Robert G. Walker has pointed out, this argument probably derives
from a similar argument put forth by Tillotson in his The Rule of Faith
(Walker, "Credibility" 254-55). The idea that the degree of assent
should be proportioned to the degree of evidence's credibility "was a

keystone of seventeenth-century Anglican apologetics" (Walker, "Evidences" 33).
Like many of his contemporaries, Johnson believed that the really
essential truths of the Christian religion are clear, understandable, and
well attested:

For revealed religion, he said, there was such historical evidence, as,

upon any subject not religious, would have left no doubt. Had the facts
recorded in the New Testament been mere civil occurrences, no one
would have called in question the testimony by which they are established; but the importance annexed to them, amounting to nothing less
than the salvation of mankind, raised a cloud in our minds, and created

doubts unknown upon any other subject.
With regard to evidence, Dr. Johnson observed that we had not such
evidence that Caesar died in the Capitol, as that Christ died in the manner related. {Johnsonian Miscellanies 2: 384)

Johnson felt that the Christian faith rested upon credible historical evi-

dence; thus he could use sceptical doubt defensively, showing that
excessive doubts were disproportionate to the weight of testimony.
This common-sense solution to the problem of religious doubt
seems to have satisfied Johnson. Whatever his religious uncertainties,
they seem to have related more to the question of his own spiritual
worth than to the question of faith. Indeed, Johnson regarded extreme

scepticism in philosophy and religion as downright pathological; his
Rambler 95 is a portrait of a sceptic Johnson calls Pertinax, who

searches "not after proofs, but objections" (Yale Works 4: 146). This
habit of radical doubt leads him into psychopathological confusion

from which he barely recovers. As Chester Chapin points out, "Johnson considers radical skepticism a mental disease, something quite dif-

ferent from that creative distrust which leads to the discovery of truth"
("Common Sense" 63).
In addition to this constructive scepticism that sought a common-
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sensical solution to the problem of the "Rule of Faith," concerning
itself particularly with the historical reliability of the "evidences" for
faith, there was another sceptical influence upon Johnson. This was
the epistemology deriving from Bacon and Locke that sought to
resolve the problem of truth-criteria in the physical sciences: if words
and ideas are built upon sense data, and if sense data are unreliable,

then the language and concepts of science are doubtful, too. Empiricist
epistemology had to justify itself against the age-old problem posed by
the sceptics: how can we ever know the true inner workings of nature,
when perception touches only nature's surfaces?
One answer was Bacon's view of human knowledge, which took into

account the "idols" of human language and perception in order "to
reconstitute knowledge on a basis of certainty."4 In epistemology, Pyrrhonism threatened to undermine the claims of the new science by
pointing out that since our knowledge of phenomena is derived from

potentially deceptive sense data, we can know only the outward manifestations of things, not their inner or essential natures. To Johnson, as

to Bacon, the surest refutation of such doubts was the knowledge provided by the new science in its program of "ordered study, diligent
observation and experimentation" (Schwartz 7O).5 In Bacon, perhaps,
he could see the empiricist's use of sceptical doubt as a means of reaching probable truth, rather than as an evasion or rejection of all knowl-

edge that falls short of certainty.
If Bacon was empiricism's advocate and exemplar, its theorist was
Locke. From the constructive sceptics Locke adapted the notion of

degrees of assent, correlating them with three levels of knowledge:
intuitive knowledge, demonstrative knowledge, and opinion. Intuitive
knowledge, in Locke's familiar argument, is based upon the immediate, intuitively perceived congruity of clear and distinct ideas; demonstrative knowledge is based upon linked series of such congruities; and

opinion or judgment is based upon ideas whose congruity or incongruity is not immediately apparent. Locke's theory rescues empirical

knowledge from the sceptics by assigning to the rational faculty of
judgment the task of weighing probabilities where certainties are
impossible.
Johnson habitually draws the distinction between demonstrative

and probabilistic reasoning; he once commented characteristically that
"[t]he next degree of satisfaction to the attainment of certainty is the
knowledge that certainty cannot be attained" (McAdam 98). Like John
Locke's, Johnson's probabilism served to anchor his view of knowledge between the extremes of scepticism and dogmatism (Trowbridge
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4-5), and, like Locke's, his probabilism derived many of its characteristic assumptions from constructive scepticism.
While Locke and the constructive sceptics helped to shape John-

son's style of thinking, an avowed sceptic helped Johnson find his
manner of arguing: Pierre Bayle. Johnson's distinctive biographical
persona is that of a Christian moralist who uses the tone of a radical
sceptic, and this sceptical manner derives from Bayle. Johnson used A
General Dictionary, Historical and Critical (1734-41), an English work
based on Bayle, as a source in the Lives of the Poets (Rogers 150), and
he told Boswell that "Bayle's Dictionary is a very useful work for those
who love the biographical part of literature, which is what I love
most" (1: 425). Scattered references to Bayle suggest that it was especially Bayle the biographer and critical historian that Johnson admired
and emulated (see Boswell 1: 285 and 5: 287).
Johnson was Baylean, too, in his famous preference for factual
genresÂ—a "preference rooted in a respect for the authority of concrete
fact and immediate observation" (Edinger 78). In a way, Idler 84 is a
Baylean defense of historical criticism:
Certainty of knowledge not only excludes mistake, but fortifies veracity. What we collect by conjecture, and by conjecture only can one man
judge of another's motives or sentiments, is easily modified by fancy or
desire; as objects imperfectly discerned, take forms from the hope or fear
of the beholder. But that which is fully known cannot be falsified but
with reluctance of understanding, and alarm of conscience. (Yale Works
2: 263)

Biography was the perfect vehicle for the Baylean critical project: the
establishment of the "fully known" upon the ruins of the falsified.
The biographies originally entitled Prefaces, Biographical and Critical are critical in still another, more important sense: Johnson's criticism, like Bayle's, facilitates a direct relationship between the reader's
judgment and the text, and thereby it transfers authority from text to
critical reader. Criticism in this broad sense, Jean Starobinski argues,
defends human judgment against the "risk of disorder" entailed by the

Renaissance's massive restoration of history, its "influx of information":

Criticism (particularly as practiced by Pierre Bayle) discovers history
not in the narration, but in the very act of situating such historical material as has been verified by the best available resources. The collation of
evidence, the rejection of all opinions adopted solely on the guarantee of
a so-called trustworthy source, the battle against false conclusions, para-
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logisms whose theses are supported only by dogmatic tenets: such are
some of the aspects of that extirpation of errors which constitutes the

official intention of Bayle's Dictionary. (4)
Precisely such extirpation of errors, collation of evidence, rejection

of opinions, and evaluation of testimony distinguish Johnson's Lives as
critical biographies. Johnson's historical scepticismÂ—more precisely,
his constant attempt to employ that scepticism constructivelyÂ—puts
him in the Enlightenment critical tradition initiated by Bayle, who
saw as the purpose of criticism the strengthening of the reader's independent judgment.

Bayle defended the value of historical study by invoking the familiar
principle of degrees of assent, arguing that probable conclusions

should be valued according to the kind of certitude appropriate to
them. He gave as an example of historical truth the sort of common-

place illustration constantly employed by the constructive sceptics: the
well-attested truth that Caesar defeated Pompey. Sceptics usually
argued that truth based on historical testimony was less certain than

demonstrative truth, but Bayle turns this around to argue for the superior credibility of historical factÂ—"not because . . . [fact] can be employed within the perspective of a broad historical narration based on

the ensemble of verified facts, but because the critical act [of ascertaining factual truth] has a value of its own" (Starobinski 5). Bayle and
Johnson part company here, since for Bayle "the criticism of factual

errors becomes instrumental in a general criticism" that ultimately
undermines theological discourse (Starobinski 6), while for Johnson
critical thought serves to strengthen faith. But we should follow

Margaret Wiley in drawing a distinction between scepticism as a product, a type of inverted dogmatism, and scepticism as an active process
of truth-seeking by means of dialectical habits of thought (16-18).
Johnson is vigorously sceptical in this latter sense, and much of his
scepticism takes Bayle as its enabling precedent.
II

While the lines of sceptical influence upon Johnson may be complex,
tangled, and elusive, their effects are clear and immediate. Epistemologically, Johnson is guided by an effective and consistent theory of
historical inquiry, and the best way to see this is to notice that he consistently applies constructively sceptical criteria to the evaluation of
testimony in his masterpiece, the Lives of the Poets.

Deception and self-deception are such prevalent topics in the Lives
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that they become a consistent, controlling theme; sceptical doubt is a
natural response for a writer so concerned with the ways in which we
deceive ourselves and others. Johnson "was indeed so much impressed
with the prevalence of falsehood, voluntary or unintentional," Boswell

writes, "that I never knew any person who upon hearing an extraordinary circumstance told, discovered more of the incredulus odi. He
would say with a significant look and decisive tone, 'It is not so. Do

not tell this again' " (3: 229).
Johnson's technique as a moralist-biographer is therefore always to
enact doubt for us, teaching us by example to be on guard against falsehoodÂ—for moral judgment depends upon a sense of proportion in
weighing probabilities, even to the point of a nil admiran refusal to be
impressed. "Wonders are willingly told and willingly heard," Johnson
writes, turning aside like Bayle in order to show the necessity of being
on guard against our constitutional credulity, which he calls "the natu-

ral desire of man to propagate a wonder" (Lives 3: 172; 1: 3). In one
sense, "wonder" is the enemy of morality itself, for Johnson remembers always that "we are affected only as we believe; we are improved
only as we find something to be imitated or declined" (3: 438).
Instruction depends upon credibility, and credibility depends upon a
realistic sense of what is morally possible.
The Lives are studded with references to "common topicks of false-

hood" (1: 132) propagated by biographers and their subjects. Johnson's doubts are automatically stirred up whenever a tale is too obviously of the sort that people want to believeÂ—to magnify their own
importance, to gratify their malice or envy, or just to make a good
story. Milton's purported refusal of a government post is suspect
because "large offers and sturdy rejections are among the most com-

mon topics of falsehood" (1: 132). Similarly, Johnson dismisses the
story of Dryden's being bitterly upset by Prior's mockery of The Hind
and the Panther. Johnson attacks the story's credibility by making a
comment on human gullibility: "By tales like these is the envy raised

by superior abilities every day gratified; when they are attacked, every
one hopes to see them humbled; what is hoped is readily believed, and
what is believed is confidently told" (2: 182). Johnson is amused to see
that, for the sake of a good story, witty comments are misattributed:
"A pointed sentence is bestowed by successive transmission on the last
whom it will fit" (2: 171). He is wryly aware that anecdotes are often
believed simply because they are satisfying: Milton saved Davenant's
life, according to one anecdote, and later Davenant saved Milton's.
Johnson comments: "Here is a reciprocation of generosity and grati-
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tude so pleasing that the tale makes its own way to credit" (1: 129).
Johnson then goes on to demolish the anecdote's credibility.
In addition to expressing doubts based upon general human credu-

lity, Johnson frequently comments upon his uncertainty about the
motives and feelings of his subjects. Often he pulls back from explicit
analyses of motives, and he sometimes states the grounds for his
doubts in categorical terms: "The fact is certain; the motives we
must guess" (2: 99). Again, comparing two sources whose analyses
of motives disagree: "actions are visible, though motives are sec-

ret" (2: 15).
Such uncertainties become especially pressing when determining
the subject's motives and feelings is essential to a full moral evaluation

of him. An example is the ultimately unresolvable issue of Dryden's
sincerity in his religious conversions. As a deductive premise Johnson

proposes that a "conversion will always be suspected that apparently
concurs with interest" (1: 377); yet "one [i.e., interest] may by accident introduce the other [i.e., truth]" (1: 378). Furthermore, we naturally "hope . . . that whoever is wise is also honest." "But," Johnson
concludes, "enquiries into the heart are not for man; we must now

leave him to his Judge" (1: 378).
The common element in these instances of Johnson's uncertainty is
the problematic relationship between action and motive, which is a

form of uncertainty about the relationship of signs to the things they
signify. Sometimes Johnson will discredit a piece of evidence by questioning the probability of the signs themselves; thus a story about
Addison's being upset about Windsor Forest is discredited because
"[t]he pain that Addison might feel it is not likely that he would con-

fess" (3: 106). On the other hand, when Johnson has reason to believe
that a given action is a factual and reliable indication of his subject's

feelings and motives, he says so. Some pages after the fairly elaborate
analysis of Dryden's motives outlined above, Johnson refers to Dryden's subsequent action: "It is some proof of Dryden's sincerity in his
second religion, that he taught it to his sons" (1: 394). Similarly, Dryden's "frequent bursts of resentment give reason to suspect" that his
critics and rivals disturbed his peace of mind (1: 370).

Sometimes, as Robert Folkenflik has pointed out (74-77), Johnson
presents a range of alternative motives which in effect engage the
reader in the process of biographical interpretation: "Actuated there-

fore by zeal for Rome, or hope of fame, [Dryden] published The Hind
and the Panther" (1: 380). In the Life of Thomson, Johnson suggests
that "Thomson's bashfulness, or pride, or some other motive perhaps
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not more laudable, withheld him" from acting in his own interest (3:

290). Characteristically, Johnson presents his most unflattering analyses as series of alternatives or as uncertain surmises, a technique Leo

Braudy has called the "epistemological doublet" because it sceptically
calls attention to the uncertainties of historical interpretation.6

Johnson frequently questions the validity of his sources, and his biographical scepticism expresses itself most clearly in his concern with
all of Locke's criteria for evaluating testimony. These are, to recapitu-

late briefly: the number, skill, and integrity of witnesses; the intentions
of authors; internal and circumstantial evidence that testimony is

doubtful; and contrary testimony. There is of course no way to prove
conclusively that Johnson consciously had these in mind as he evaluated biographical testimony; almost anyone involved in trying to establish biographical truth is bound to invoke one or more of these criteria.

But the integrity and consistency of Johnson's methods allow one to
make at least a probable case for the idea that his biographical scepticism derives from Locke's views on testimony.
Although Johnson certainly commits and perpetuates biographical

errors, it is fair to say that he is scrupulous, particularly compared to
other biographers of his day, in incorporating evaluation of testimony
as part of his biographical method. In such major lives as Swift,
Milton, and Addison, and in many of the less well-known lives, he

turns aside frequently to comment upon his sources' unreliability and
then shows how one can sort through such doubtful testimony to reach
some probable account of the truth (see, for example, 1: 84, 222, 241,
301; 2: 18, 37, 116, 312-13; 3: 1, 281). Sometimes "nothing ... can

be known beyond what casual mention and uncertain tradition have
supplied" (1: 331); sometimes it is impossible to determine "the writ-

er's means of information or character of veracity" (1: 409). Sometimes the very absence of testimony itself is treated as evidence: "tradi-

tional memory retains no sallies of [Pope's] raillery nor sentences of
observation, nothing either pointed or solid, either wise or merry," so
Johnson infers that it is unlikely Pope excelled in conversation (3:

201). When testimony is by its very nature conjectural and inconclusive, Johnson brands it as such in quasi-legal terms: "a crime that

admits no proof, why should we believe?" (1: 396) and "if accusation
without proof be credited, who shall be innocent?" (1: 398).
Johnson often attacks the skill of the biographers whose writings he

is using. Especially in the Life of Milton one can sense Johnson's frustration in trying to reach the truth despite the biographers' hagiographical reverence and frequent incompetence. "[T]his is another
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instance which may confirm Dalrymple's observation," Johnson observes at one point, " 'that whenever Burnet's narrations are exam-

ined, he appears to be mistaken' " (1: 128).
Questions about the integrity of witnesses constantly arouse Johnson's scepticism. He is particularly on guard against evidence that witnesses are indulging in flattery, either of themselves or others. Pope's
letters, for example, are self-serving in the way they "exhibit a perpetual and unclouded effulgence of general benevolence and particular
fondness" (3: 206). Pope also liked to flatter himself by believing himself "important and formidable" (3: 181), occasionally threatening
self-importantly to write no more. Johnson comments mordantly:
"There is nothing," says Juvenal, "that a man will not believe in his
own favour." Pope had been flattered till he thought himself one of the
moving powers in the system of life. When he talked of laying down his
pen, those who sat around him intreated and implored, and self-love did

not suffer him to suspect that they went away and laughed. (3: 153-54)

At its worst, self-flattery would seem to be morally harmless, though
worthy of ridicule. But Johnson hates self-importance precisely because it leads to more serious distortions of the truth: "falsehoods from

which no evil immediately visible ensues, except the general degradation of human testimony, are very lightly uttered, and once uttered are
sullenly supported" (2: 213). Seemingly harmless distortions soon
damage the self-flatterer's sense of moral proportion; thus Blackmore,

though Johnson considered him "very honest," could "easily make a
false estimate of his own importance: those whom their virtue restrains
from deceiving others are often disposed by their vanity to deceive
themselves" (2: 240). From self-deception it is only a short step to
more serious folly: "He that is much flattered soon learns to flatter

himself: we are commonly taught our duty by fear or shame, and how
can they act upon the man who hears nothing but his own praises?" (3:
46). Johnson carries his moralizing treatment of self-flattery farthest in
the Life of Halifax, which actually ends with a five-paragraph "moral
essay" on the seductive appeal of flattery and self-flattery, so that Halifax becomes a warning example of the folly of believing those who sing
our praises (2: 46-47).
Both in theory and in practice Johnson resists his predecessors' con-

ception of biography as extended narrative in praise of an exemplary
subject; he detests a life written as "a funeral oration rather than a his-

tory," distorted by "all the partiality of friendship" (1: 1; 2: 1). He
questions biographical testimony whenever it bears signs of an overes-
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timation of the subject: Warburton gullibly believes Pope stopped
writing satires because of his "despair of prevailing over the corruption of his time" (3: 181); Tickell foolishly thinks Addison initialed his
Spectator pieces to avoid "usurping the praise of others" (2: 105); Fenton naively implies that only Roscommon's severe judgment kept him
from being prolific (1: 234-35).

In general, Johnson is especially wary of sources' favorable biases,
but he also notes when testimony is consistently hostile. For example,
he points out that "Burnet is not very favourable to his [Sprat's] memory" because "he and Burnet were old rivals" (2: 37). Johnson recognizes that to some extent, most testimony is potentially hostile; everyone envies the great, and thus everyone has some interest in spreading
unflattering stories: "By tales like these is the envy raised by superior
abilities every day gratified" (2: 182).
Johnson's suspicions are also frequently aroused by internal evidence that testimony is doubtful; in Locke's terms, either internal contradictions or unlikely circumstances may call a piece of testimony into
doubt.

Johnson's frequent analyses of internal contradictions bring to mind
the image of Johnson as a lawyer cross-examining witnesses. He cites
Dryden's self-defense against the charge of plagiarism in one breath,
and in the next points out that Dryden nevertheless "relates how
much labour he spends in fitting for the English stage what he bor-

rows from others" (1: 347-48). In the Life of Butler, Johnson cites Butler's brother as a witness that Butler attended CambridgeÂ—but finds

inconsistent his inability to identify his college, which "gives reason to
suspect that he was resolved to bestow on him an academical education" (1: 202).
Johnson's most characteristic doubts, however, are stirred up by

improbable circumstances. This is the area in which Johnson most
clearly enjoys displaying his scepticism and showing the power of
independent judgment operating upon experience. Rather than simply
setting aside doubtful pieces of testimony, he exhibits them in good
Baylean fashion and exposes their unlikeliness. Often the occasions for
Johnson's doubts are relatively unimportant. He devotes a paragraph
to probable arguments against the trivial though much-discussed
notion that Milton's daughter could recite the opening lines of Homer,

Ovid, and Euripides (1: 158-59). He argues against Swift's belief that
eating fruit caused his ear malady: "Almost every boy eats as much
fruit as he can get, without any great inconvenience" (3: 4). He finds it
unlikely that one of Pope's instructors "could spend, with a boy who
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had translated so much of Ovid, some months over a small part of
Tully's Offices" (3: 86). With some typically Johnsonian calculations
he attacks the apparently grandiose claim that William King read and
wrote comments on 22,000 books and manuscripts: "The books were

certainly not long, the manuscripts not very difficult, nor the remarks
very large; for the calculator will find that he dispatched seven a day,
for every day of his eight years, with a remnant that more than satisfies
most other students" (2: 26).
Johnson has a keen eye for improbable behavior. As a student of the

passions, Johnson knows the effects of envy too well to believe that
John Philips "so much endeared himself to his schoolfellows . . . that

they without murmur or ill-will saw him indulged by the master with
particular immunities" (1: 312). As a writer well acquainted with the
rigors of authorship, Johnson doubts that Christopher Pitt translated
Virgil "with great indifference, and with a progress of which himself
was hardly conscious" (3: 278). And as a careful observer of social
behavior, Johnson doubts that Addison was as shy as Chesterfield
claimed: "That man cannot be supposed very unexpert in the arts of
conversation and practice of life, who, without fortune or alliance, by
his usefulness and dexterity became secretary of state" (2: 119). In
such passages we feel Johnson's scepticism at its most forceful. His
arguments based on his knowledge of probable human behavior are
persuasive and final.
Examples of Johnson's doubts arising from Locke's final criterion,
contrary testimony, have already been discussed by implication; John-

son evaluates contrary testimony whenever he collates and compares
various biographical sources. He uses an interesting rule of thumb: a

person's enemies give more credible testimony for him than his friends
do. We know that Swift worked hard to promote Pope's subscriptions
because "there remains the testimony of Kennet, no friend to either

him or Pope" (3: 130), and Blackmore, though "oftener mentioned by
enemies than by friends," was never reproached for any failings in his
private life (2: 236, 254-55). The view of Addison given by his friends
"was never contradicted by his enemies" (2: 125) and may therefore be
believed. Prior "lived at a time when the rage of party detected all
which it was any man's interest to hide; and as little ill is heard of
Prior it is certain that not much is known" (2: 197).

In the handling of biographical testimony, then, Johnson's practice
fully accords with the Lockean criteria for evaluating the evidence of
witnesses: collate and compare sources when evidence is scanty; weigh
the witness's skill and integrity, particularly noting hostile and favor-
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able biases and tendencies to flatter self or subject; weigh the witness's
overall intentions; set aside evidence marred by unlikely circumstances
or internal contradictions; resolve contradictions by giving added
weight to such probable testimony as favorable accounts from hostile
witnesses.

Johnson's importance as a founder of literary biography is based
partly on his willingness to go still further in using literary evidence.
He does not hesitate to use an author's works as evidence of his charac-

ter, as in his extended analyses of Dryden and Pope, which link the
author's personalities and works. In this area, as in others, Johnson
sets a sceptical example for future literary biographers, because he is

vigorously aware of the dangers of drawing biographical inferences
from literary works. And while the sceptical tone and method of Johnson's biographies owe much to the sceptical modes of argument in the
religious, scientific, and philosophical writings of his day, Johnson's
biographical scepticism is grounded finally in his awareness of the difficulty of inferentially knowing another human being. His scepticism,
in fact, is subsumed by his irony; the wish to understand another
human being sometimes becomes another vain human wish which life

ironically frustrates. He recognizes the ironies of the biographer's
effort, which is merely the human effort to understand another, to
understand one another:

The biographer of Thomson has remarked that an author's life is best

read in his works: his observation was not well timed. Savage, who lived
much with Thomson, once told me how he heard a lady remarking that
she could gather from his works three parts of his character, that he was
"a great lover, a great swimmer, and rigorously abstinent"; but, said
Savage, he knows not any love but that of the sex; he was perhaps never
in cold water in his life; and he indulges himself in all the luxury that
comes within his reach. (3: 297-98)
Wright State University
notes

1. The term "constructive scepticism" is used by Richard H. Popkin, The History of
Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (1960; rev. ed. 1964; Berkeley: U of California P, 1979). See also Popkin's two articles on scepticism in the eighteenth
century. The most helpful discussion of Johnson's scepticism is still that by
Robert Voitle; see his 168-80.

2. Philosophical scepticism traditionally has been sub-divided into two categories
deriving from two Hellenistic schools of philosophy: Academic scepticism
held "that no knowledge was possible," while Pyrrhonian scepticism held
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"that there was insufficient and inadequate evidence to determine if any
knowledge was possible, and hence that one ought to suspend judgment"
(Popkin, History of Scepticism xiii).
3. See Greene, Library 60; see also Johnson, Lives 2: 33. Subsequent references to the
Lives are parenthetical, giving volume and page number.

4. Shapiro 14. Johnson finished reading all of Bacon relatively late in life, but he had
always admired and imitated Bacon's prose style, and Bacon's influence upon
him was lifelong and pervasive; see Boswell 1: 219 and 3: 194.

5. Like most writers, Schwartz treats Bacon as the representative exponent of the new
science and its epistemology. For a contrasting view which places Bacon outside the mainstream of seventeenth-century sceptical epistemology and sees
him instead as "essentially of the traditional Aristotelian pattern," see Van
Leeuwen 1-12.

6. Robert Folkenflik points out Johnson's use of such doublets and cites Braudy on
Gibbon in Samuel Johnson, Biographer 74-75n9.
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